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Abstract. Adversarial attacks are considered a potentially serious secu-
rity threat for machine learning systems. Medical image analysis (MedIA)
systems have recently been argued to be particularly vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks due to strong financial incentives. In this paper, we study
several previously unexplored factors affecting adversarial attack vulner-
ability of deep learning MedIA systems in three medical domains: oph-
thalmology, radiology and pathology. Firstly, we study the effect of vary-
ing the degree of adversarial perturbation on the attack performance and
its visual perceptibility. Secondly, we study how pre-training on a public
dataset (ImageNet) affects the models’ vulnerability to attacks. Thirdly,
we study the influence of data and model architecture disparity between
target and attacker models. Our experiments show that the degree of
perturbation significantly affects both performance and human percep-
tibility of attacks. Pre-training may dramatically increase the transfer of
adversarial examples; the larger the performance gain achieved by pre-
training, the larger the transfer. Finally, disparity in data and/or model
architecture between target and attacker models substantially decreases
the success of attacks. We believe that these factors should be considered
when designing cybersecurity-critical MedIA systems, as well as kept in
mind when evaluating their vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
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1 Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has been shown to achieve close or even superior performance
to that of experts in medical image analysis (MedIA) applications, including
in ophthalmology [1, 2], radiology [3], and pathology [4–6]. This has created
an opportunity for automation of certain tasks and the subsequent regulatory
approval for the integration of DL systems in clinical settings [7].
A threat to DL systems is posed by so-called “adversarial attacks”. Such
attacks apply a carefully engineered, subtle perturbation to the target model’s
input to cause misclassification. Such perturbed inputs, called “adversarial ex-
amples”, have been shown effective in fooling state-of-the-art systems [8,9]. Ad-
versarial attack methods have been proposed for scenarios assuming different de-
grees of knowledge of the target system [10]: from having full knowledge (“white-
box” attacks) [8] to being agnostic to the (hyper)parameters of the target model
(“black-box” attacks) [11]. The latter usually use another network, commonly
referred to as surrogate, to craft adversarial examples.
Finlayson et al. [12, 13] have recently argued that adversarial attacks pose
a disproportionately large threat in the medical domain due to two factors:
first, certain parties involved in healthcare systems have very strong financial
incentives to adversarially manipulate medical data, including images; second,
certain characteristics of medical data and technological infrastructure around
it may allow more effective and less detectable attacks.
Several studies have investigated adversarial attack vulnerability of DL Me-
dIA systems for classification and segmentation in different imaging modali-
ties, including color fundus (CF) imaging [13–15], chest X-ray [13, 14, 16], der-
moscopy [13–15, 17], and brain MRI [17]. In these studies, adversarial attacks
were proven effective in both white- and black-box settings. However, some cru-
cial aspects of adversarial attacks on MedIA systems have not been studied yet:
Perturbation degree and perceptibility of attacks: Most studies [13,
16, 17] only used one perturbation degree in their experiments, although this
parameter highly affects performance. One study [14] analyzed the impact of
different degrees of perturbation, but only in a white-box setting. To our knowl-
edge, no studies explored the effect of perturbation degree in black-box settings,
which are more realistic. Furthermore, existing studies rarely discuss visual per-
ceptibility of perturbations in adversarial examples, which might compromise
the attack’s effectiveness in MedIA settings where human input is required.
Pre-training: Pre-training may positively affect the transfer of adversarial
attacks between target and surrogate models, since it increases the similarity
between them. This could mean that this popular design choice [18] should be
reconsidered as it poses a security risk. Existing studies on adversarial attacks
often use target and surrogate models that were pre-trained on the same data,
specifically ImageNet [13, 14, 17], but do not study the influence of such pre-
training on attack transferability.
Data and model architecture disparity: Although some studies analyzed
black-box attack transferability between targets and surrogates not sharing the
same network architecture [16, 17], all studies assumed perfect data parity, i.e.
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surrogate and target models were trained on the exact same subset of the same
dataset. This assumption is highly unrealistic when applied to real-world DL
MedIA systems, which are most often closed source and use large amounts of
private training data [19–21].
In our study, we investigate these aspects of adversarial attacks in three
MedIA applications: detection of referable diabetic retinopathy in CF images,
classification of pathologies in chest X-Ray, and breast cancer metastasis de-
tection in histological lymph node sections. Our findings have implications on
the design of cyber-secure DL MedIA systems and on practices for evaluating
adversarial attack vulnerability of these systems in realistic attack scenarios.
2 Methods
2.1 Adversarial attacks
In this study, we used two adversarial attack methods that were most commonly
used in the literature with high effectiveness [13–17]: fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [8] and projected gradient descent (PGD) [9]. In FGSM, the adversarial
perturbation is computed as the sign of the gradient of the loss with respect to
the input image. This adversarial perturbation is subsequently multiplied by a
parameter , to control the perturbation degree, and added to the target image
x to create an adversarial example: xadv = x + sign(∇xL(f(x; θ), y), where L
represents the loss, f the selected network architecture, θ the corresponding
parameters, and y the image label. PGD is an iterative version of FGSM, in
which several steps for computing the perturbation and adding it to the input are
performed: x
(i+1)
adv = clip

x
{
x(i) + αsign(∇xL(f(x(i); θ), y)
}
, where α controls the
step size and  is the parameter regulating the maximum amount of perturbation
added to every pixel. We applied both methods in the black-box setting, since
we consider it to be the most realistic setting for MedIA systems. In this setting,
f ′(·, θ′) of a surrogate model is used to compute the attack and transfer it to a
target model.
To control that the target model performance is reduced solely due to the ad-
versarial perturbation, we additionally computed “control” noise. While existing
works chose standard noise distributions such as Gaussian for this purpose [17],
we chose to compare adversarial perturbations with its spatially shuffled version
to ensure the same degree of perturbation in adversarial and “control” examples.
2.2 Network training and data
We used two architectures as both target and surrogate models. We chose Inception-
v3 [22] and Densenet-121 [23] as both were previously applied in our selected ap-
plications and achieved good performance [1,3,24,25]. All networks were trained
using Adam optimization with learning rate decay and binary cross-entropy loss.
For the dataset used in each application, a development and a test set were
defined. The development set was used for training and validation of the target
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and surrogate models. We randomly divided all development sets, at patient-
level, into two non-overlapping, equal-sized parts: d1 and d2 to be able to study
the influence of data parity on attack transferability. A third set, d2/2, was
created by randomly sampling half of d2 to study the influence of dataset size.
The independent test set was used to measure the performance of each model
on clean and adversarial examples. The description of each dataset and dataset-
specific network parameters are stated below.
Ophthalmology We used the Kaggle dataset for diabetic retinopathy (DR)
detection [26], which contains 88,702 color fundus images with manually-labeled
DR severity. In order to have more images available for development, as pro-
posed in Finlayson et al. [13], we merged the original training (35,126 images)
and test sets (53,576 images) and split the images randomly at patient-level for
development (88%) and testing (12%).
Pre-processing included extracting the field of view and rescaling to 512×512
pixels. The networks were trained to distinguish between non-referable (stages 0
to 1) and referable DR (stages 2 to 4) using batch class balancing, and flipping
and rotation for data augmentation.
Radiology We used the ChestX-Ray14 dataset [27], consisting of 112,120 frontal-
view X-rays annotated with 14 pathology labels. The official data split (80%-
20%) was used to define our development and test sets.
Pre-processing included downsampling images to 256 × 256 resolution. We
used translation and horizontal flipping for data augmentation.
Pathology We used the PatchCamelyon (PCam) [25] dataset, which contains
327,680 patches extracted from histopathology images of lymph node sections,
labeled with the presence of metastatic tissue in the patch center. The official
data split (90%-10%) was used to define our development and test sets.
The top layers of both model architectures were replaced with a global aver-
age pooling layer followed by a dense layer with one output and sigmoid activa-
tion to be able to handle the 96 × 96 resolution of the input. As data augmen-
tation, we used flipping and color augmentation.
3 Experimental setups
Perturbation degree and perceptibility of attacks In the first experiment,
we studied the performance of FGSM and PGD attacks under different degrees of
perturbation (controlled by ) and the visual perceptibility of the perturbations.
We evaluated the attacks for : 0.02, 0.04, and 0.06. These values were applied
to images rescaled between -1 and 1. In early experiments, we found  = 0.02
to be visually imperceptible or very subtle across datasets. We therefore did not
experiment with lower values of . For the PGD attacks, we used α = 0.01 and 20
iterations. In this experiment, all models were randomly initialized and trained
on the same partition of the development set, d1.
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Pre-training In the second experiment, we measured the attack effectiveness
when target and surrogate are both pre-trained on ImageNet, both randomly
initialized, or have different initializations (pre-trained or random). For this
purpose, we trained four versions of each architecture (two pre-trained and two
randomly initialized) to cover all possible target-surrogate combinations in black-
box settings, using the same partition of the development set, d1.
Data and model architecture disparity This experiment focused on the
effect of disparity in the data used for the development of target and surrogate
model, as well as its interaction with architecture disparity. Here, we trained
four randomly-initialized versions of each architecture: a target model trained
on d1 and three surrogate models trained on d1, d2, and d2/2, respectively.
In all experimental setups, the performance of the target models on the test
set of each dataset was measured using the area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve (AUC) or mean AUC for the multi-class case.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Perturbation degree and perceptibility of attacks
The results of our experiments with different attack methods (FGSM and PGD)
at different perturbation degrees can be found in Table 1. Higher perturbation
degrees lead to substantially lower performance of target models. Experiments
with spatially shuffled noise suggest that at higher noise magnitudes part of the
performance drop was due to image corruption by the noise, though to a rather
small extent. FGSM and PGD performed similarly. Based on this observation,
we chose to use both attacks in our subsequent experiments and report average
results.
Figure 1 shows original images and their adversarial counterparts computed
using FGSM attack at different perturbation degrees. As can be seen, applying
Table 1. Effects of perturbation degree on attack transferability. Average performance
(AUC) over two model architectures is shown when using FGSM, PGD or “control”
noise (spatially shuffled adversarial perturbations) with varying perturbation degrees.
Data Noise FGSM PGD
 = 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06
Ophthalmology - 0.86
Ophthalmology adversarial 0.44 0.32 0.33 0.56 0.37 0.34
Ophthalmology shuffled 0.85 0.79 0.73 0.85 0.84 0.84
Radiology - 0.80
Radiology adversarial 0.62 0.57 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.49
Radiology shuffled 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.79
Pathology - 0.87
Pathology adversarial 0.56 0.38 0.33 0.56 0.41 0.36
Pathology shuffled 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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the same amount of perturbation to different imaging modalities has a different
effect on the perceptibility of the perturbation. In this experiment, we used
our own visual perception. For the ophthalmology and pathology datasets, we
found the perturbation perceptible at  = 0.04 or larger. For the radiology
dataset, the perturbations were already perceptible at  = 0.02, albeit quite
subtle. These differences in perceptibility could occur because of differences in
color, homogeneity, contrast, and resolution between the imaging modalities.
Furthermore, the judgement of perceptibility is subjective and depends on the
background and goal of the observer. Adversarial attack perceptibility by trained
medical experts could be examined in future studies.
In summary, we found that perturbation degree significantly affects both
performance and visual perceptibility of attacks. It is important to study higher
perturbation degrees to not underestimate the attack vulnerability of the studied
Fig. 1. Original and adversarial images created with FGSM using different perturba-
tion magnitudes.
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system. However, an attack performed using a conspicuous degree of perturba-
tion could be easily discovered by a (trained) human and thus neutralized. Fol-
lowing this logic, for our further experiments, we chose to report attacks using
 = 0.02, as for two out of three applications this was the highest perturbation
degree that was still visually subtle.
4.2 Pre-training
Table 2 summarizes our experiments on the effect of pre-training on adversarial
attack transferability. In the ophthalmology and radiology datasets, the attack
transferability between pre-trained models was substantially higher than that
between randomly initialized models. This effect was very pronounced in the
ophthalmology dataset, in which pre-training also gave the highest performance
boost on clean examples. In both datasets, the effect was consistent: for all eight
combinations of attack method and target and surrogate pairs, pre-trained tar-
gets had lower performance when attacked by pre-trained surrogates, compared
to their randomly initialized counterparts. In the pathology dataset, however,
the opposite effect was observed with similar consistency.
In the ophthalmology and pathology datasets, pre-trained targets were con-
sistently less vulnerable to the attacks by randomly initialized surrogates than
randomly initialized targets to the attacks of pre-trained surrogates. The op-
posite consistent effect was observed in the radiology dataset. On average, pre-
trained networks were moderately more vulnerable to attacks in ophthalmology
and radiology datasets and slightly less in the pathology dataset.
We believe the increased transfer between pre-trained models may occur
because their decision boundaries are more similar than those of randomly ini-
tialized models. This may hold more strongly for models where pre-training de-
creases the number of training epochs and/or improves the performance. Overall,
we observed that pre-training MedIA networks on ImageNet may dramatically
increase the transfer of adversarial examples; the larger the performance gain
achieved by pre-training, the larger the transfer. We believe this effect should be
considered when designing secure DL MedIA systems for deployment in clinical
practice, as well as in future studies on adversarial attacks, since pre-training is
Table 2. Effects of pre-training on attack transferability. Average performance (AUC)
over FGSM and PGD (=0.02) and two model architectures is shown. Average relative
performance with respect to the no-attack setting is shown in brackets.
Target Surrogate Ophthalmology Radiology Pathology
ImageNet - 0.94 (100%) 0.82 (100%) 0.87 (100%)
ImageNet ImageNet 0.12 (13%) Avg: 0.52 (64%) Avg: 0.68 (78%) Avg:
ImageNet Random 0.83 (88%) 51% 0.64 (78%) 71% 0.73 (84%) 81%
Random - 0.86 (100%) 0.80 (100%) 0.87 (100%)
Random ImageNet 0.67 (79%) Avg: 0.73 (91%) Avg: 0.65 (75%) Avg:
Random Random 0.50 (58%) 69% 0.63 (79%) 85% 0.56 (65%) 70%
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an optional (although popular) design choice and introduces a possible vulnera-
bility to attacks.
4.3 Data and model architecture disparity
The effects of data and model architecture disparity between target and surro-
gate models can be seen in Table 3. For all datasets, networks were substantially
less susceptible to attacks crafted using surrogates with the same architecture
but trained on a different data subset (d2 or d2/2 ). This held for both target ar-
chitectures and both attack methods. Decreasing the surrogate training set size
(from d2 to d2/2 ) led to a drop in the attack performance for the ophthalmology
and radiology data. When the architecture of the surrogate was different, how-
ever, data disparity between the target and surrogate substantially decreased
the attack performance only for the ophthalmology data. Disparity in the model
architecture had greater effect on attack performance than disparity in data
for radiology and pathology data; for the ophthalmology data, it had equal or
smaller effect, depending on the degree of data disparity.
We believe that, since most MedIA systems are closed source and use private
training data, the attack scenario in which data and model parameters of target
and surrogate do not (completely) overlap is more realistic than one assuming
data and model parity. Our results show that in case of disparity the attacks
perform substantially poorer than in case of parity, which is commonly assumed
by existing studies [13,14,16,17]. By the same token, designers of MedIA systems
could consider using private data rather than public; keeping model information
private; and designing custom systems instead of using standard architectures.
5 Conclusion
In our experiments, we observed that higher perturbation levels lead to increased
success of attacks, but also to increased visual perceptibility, which might com-
promise their effectiveness in MedIA settings where human input is required.
Table 3. Effects of data and model architecture parity on attack transferability. Aver-
age performance (AUC) over FGSM and PGD (=0.02) and two model architectures is
shown, with surrogate models trained on different sets. Average relative performance
with respect to the no-attack setting is shown in brackets.
Architecture Training set Ophthalmology Radiology Pathology
- - 0.86 (100%) 0.80 (100%) 0.87 (100%)
Same d1 0.44 (52%) 0.55 (69%) 0.41 (47%)
Same d2 0.56 (65%) 0.64 (80%) 0.67 (77%)
Same d2/2 0.75 (88%) 0.66 (83%) 0.65 (75%)
Different d1 0.55 (65%) 0.70 (88%) 0.71 (82%)
Different d2 0.66 (77%) 0.70 (88%) 0.74 (85%)
Different d2/2 0.80 (93%) 0.72 (90%) 0.71 (81%)
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We observed that pre-training MedIA networks on ImageNet may dramatically
increase the transfer of adversarial examples; the larger the performance gain
achieved by pre-training, the larger the transfer. Lastly, dataset and model ar-
chitecture disparity between target and surrogate models can substantially de-
crease the success of attacks. We believe that these factors should be considered
in the design of cybersecurity-critical MedIA systems, as well as kept in mind
when evaluating vulnerability of these systems to adversarial attacks.
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